Is Croatian EU dream going to appear as a nightmare

Tomorrow Croatia will become a member of the European Union. Nevertheless, many would still predict that there is almost no chance for Croatia, or for any other Balkan state, to achieve the level of autonomy (inside or outside of the EU) which would be enough for these countries to be labeled as sovereign. Some others would probably say that Croatia has just launched the happiest era in the history, but this is in my opinion not even worth of opposing. Instead, I will shortly elaborate on the alternative for the subordinated ex - YU sphere, including Croatia.   

Not only recently, but many have been pessimistic towards the so called Western Balkans since centuries. Even Engels was harsh towards southern Slavs whom he described as 'peoples which have never had history of their own...who are not viable and never will be able to achieve any kind of independence¹

According to this, neither Croatia, nor Slovenia or any other potential EU member from the Balkans will never be able to achieve independence, no matter what. While this is certainly true in the case of the 'independent' Croatia and Slovenia within EU, same as of the other post - Yugoslav 'independent' states which are still waiting in what David Harvey calls the waiting room of history, one important fact should not be neglected.

Namely, all these territories had spent a long time under the dominance of different empires. Consequentially, in the modern era, they hadn't managed to achieve de facto independence before 20^th century. The only historical moment in which southern Slavs made this step towards more independence was therefore within the SFR Yugoslavia (since the previously formed Kingdom of Yugoslavia was a Serbian dominated state), because the most significant factor that determined the relationship between the center and periphery in the 16th century, as Wollerstein argues, was a strong state.2

Thus, as soon as Croatia discover, what Slovenia has already discovered - that their future within the EU is quite miserable, they might recall the idea suggested in this text, but also in many others before. The part which is missing from the Engels's statement is therefore, that 'southern Slavs would have never been able to achieve independence – if they had stayed divided'. At the moment, all the former Yugoslav republics (including the most developed Slovenia) are doing much worse now than during the Yugoslav era. Instead of being the periphery out of the EU, Croatia thus became the periphery within EU. One could logically ask, isn't this still, a step forward? And the answer would be 'yes, it is', but not in a sense in which the protagonists of the dominant political discourse would put it. As a matter of fact, this is the first and the last step forward that any of the states from the European periphery can make. As soon as this becomes more clear, coming closer to the capitalist core and thus, coming to the position of being the exploiter instead of the exploited, will look like a mission impossible.  

Instead of neglecting the reality and following the 'European path' as suggested by the 'transitologests' on one hand or anti – western, nationalistic perceptions of Serbia or Croatia on the other, the third way, and the way out from the 'periphery trap', might be the unification of the region which is enveloped by this hard disease called dependency. What one could come up with, in order to challenge this idea, is the impossibility of any reunion of the region due to the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. Nevertheless in one of the conversations I've had with Croatian philosopher Boris Buden, he said something that has never drew my attention before and which has inspired me to say the following. 
Not only that all the ex YU republics have achieved the most remarkable level of the independence in their history, within socialistic Yugoslavia, but also national aspirations could have been achieved rather in the socialist Yugoslavia, then in any other possible scenario (including the EU membership). If we assume that what is often labeled as 'national interest' demands independence, the situation in which all the former Yugoslav states are today, doesn't allow them to fulfill any of their interests, including the ideological aspirations of those who have significantly contributed to the dissolution of that country – the nationalists. Actually, they only shifted the focus from one dominant discourse to another (from the social to the national / ethnic / religious). This is what Rastko Mocnik calls the 'ethniticisation of the exploited classes'.  More so, in spite of the failure of their ideological project (due to theoretical impossibility to achieve nationalistic paradise under the de facto foreign rule) they succeeded in securing their own beneficial positions within peripheral societies ³ , while still presenting the outcomes of what they have done as a victory of the nation. This is why Croatian elite is happy with their country becoming a member of the EU. This is why in Croatia, same as elsewhere in the Eastern Europe, only one class will benefit at the expense of the other and the EU is actually one of the strongest instruments for the legitimization of this process. What has already happened in Croatia, same as in all other ex - YU states, is the internalization of the external hegemonic discourse, by the domestic elite. Furthermore, what the accession to the EU will bring to the Croatian society, is even more backup support for this process. 

However, I am not as pessimistic as Engels was. What we can do with regards to this situation, is first diminishing the domination of the transitional discourse. This should be made first domestically, by disclosure of real intentions and interests of the local elites. The key is therefore in abandoning the present perception of reality and turning towards something new, but at the level of the whole Yugoslav sphere, rather than separately. Finally, the main point is rather going to be clarified by the words of Boris Buden: It doesn't mean that a better world is possible only in the past, but rather that its improvement without past is not possible.⁴

 

1see: Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of nationalism, Freed Halliday, 2000, p. 28

2'While the sixteenth century was a period of the rise of state power in western Europe, it was an era of decline for state power in eastern Europe, both cause and consequence of the latter's economic position', Wallerstein, p. 309

3 'I argue that violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites in order to create a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity' ; Gagnon, V.P. , Nationalism and ethnic conflicts – article: Ethnic nationalism and international conflict, US, 2002, p. 134

4 Buden, p. 188

Did Djindjic prove to be more naive than Adenauer? (The Marshall plan for the Balkans)

When he was asked in an interview for a German magazine in August 1999, about the desirable strategy of the West towards the Balkans, Mr. Djindjic replied:

'What should be done now is to dry out the 'bar of destruction'. Joschka Fisher (at the time Vice Chancellor of Germany) has already given the first propositions which go into that direction. Some kind of Marshall Plan for the Balkans.' The second participant in this interview, Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek replied: 'That is so naive. I'm afraid that the Marshall plan would turn the Balkans into a temporary protectorate that it will exploit the region economically.⁷⁶

On one hand Mr. Djindjic envisioned European Serbia. As he put it, 'The west has to accept that the Balkans is a part of Europe. Without the Balkans, Europe is not complete and without Europe, Balkan is a ticking time bomb which explodes every five years'.⁷⁷ Thus, he was strongly dedicated to the project of 'Serbia in Europe'. His assumption was of course that Serbia should return to Europe, after a decade of destruction and wars. Or might he be referring to a much longer period of Serbia being out of Europe? According to his most famous book “Yugoslavia as an Unfinished state” he found that Yugoslavia it self was not a part of modern Europe – at least not in terms of the western legal definition of a modern state. According to Djindjic, even the SFR Yugoslavia was a state without statehood.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, what concerns us here, is rather his suggestion of imposing some kind of Marshall Plan upon the Balkans and by default, on Serbia. As we already know, the Marshall Plan was created after the Second World War, with an aim to help Europe economically which is why its other name was 'The European Recovery Programme'. The purpose of the plan was to create economic cooperation among the states of Europe and to stimulate economic growth in Europe⁷⁹. Up to this point, there is nothing controversial about it. Still, the Plan carried the idea that creating hope and relieving misery would diminish the appeal of Marxist arguments and the appeal of communism among Europeans that also existed⁸⁰. It is precisely this, not explicitly stated part of the plan (it was more concretely presented in in the Truman doctrine) that puts into question the real aim of the Marshall Plan. Was it an altruistic move on the part of the US, or it was just a perfect means for spreading the 'American way of life' and hegemonic role of the US around Europe in order to prevent any further spreading of communist ideology to Western Europe and so, any kind of possible resistance to the domination of the US? Perhaps the truth lies in the middle, but what may be asked in addition is, which motive prevailed, altruistic or hegemonic? The answer to this question might be crucial if we want to interpret what Mr. Djindjic meant by mentioning the 'Marshall Plan' for the Balkans.

If we take the Marshall Plan as a reference for our analysis and put the Balkans in place of Europe, and Europe in place of the US, the logic would be the following. Djindjic obviously imagined him in the role of Konrad Adenauer. Joshka Fisher, who according to Djindjic had already in 1999 envisioned a 'Marshall Plan' for the Balkans - may be George Marshall. Lets first compare the similarities.

In the original situation, the US was involved in the war (WWII), though, the extent to which the US as a state was damaged was minor in comparison with Europe. Fifty years later, the damage from the Yugoslav wars had been contained within Yugoslavia and hadn't spread to Western Europe.. So, we can say that in both cases, the regions emerging less damaged, tried to invest their money into the economic rebuilding and recovery of the wounded regions. As in the former case, the main political forces were in favor of this aid in the case of Serbia. Both Adenauer and Djindjic were somewhat cosmopolitan, but nevertheless nationalists as well (Adenauer was a CDU member, while Djindjic had on numerous occasions called for the unification of the Serbian land -Serbia, Montenegro, Republika Srpska⁸¹). In spite of the opposition coming from the Soviet Union and European communists in the former, and Serbian far right nationalists in the latter case (due to the absence of the real left), in both cases these plans had been implemented. Foreign capital entered into the damaged regions. Here we come to the crucial difference in terms of the outcomes. 

Namely, the level of the development of the regions that needed help wasn't the same. In the first case, we had highly industrialized Western Europe, which had already been an integral part of the world's flow of capital and commerce. Two wars in the first part of the 20^th century destroyed much of what had been achieved until then, but at the same time, rapid recovery after the two wars proved that their power and influence in the modern world system⁸² still remained among the very strong. In other words, Western Europe at the time could have afforded to it self even the second scenario (that the Marshall Plan had pure ideological or even imperial aims), because the price they would have to pay would not have been that high. This means that the economy of these countries would recover with the help of the foreign capital (while at the same time increasing benefits for the foreign investor's state(s)), but the mechanisms for developing the economy independently would still remain and it would only be the matter of time when this process would cease to be considered as exploitation, but rather as a game with the 'win – win' outcome. Therefore, Adenauer did not have any doubts on whether to accept the foreign aid or not - what ever the real intention of the US was. The same was valid for other developed countries of the European core at the time.

On the other hand, the situation with the Marshall Plan for the Balkans, or more specifically, Serbia – was different. Unlike Western Europe, Serbia was not as developed before the war. If we go back for a few centuries, we see that Serbia has always been the European periphery ⁸⁴. Therefore, despite the progressiveness of the Yugoslav era, Serbia was, after the wars, almost totally economically destroyed, as was Europe after the Second World War. However, the crucial difference is that Serbia in 2000 was not even close to being in a position to accept foreign aid unconditionally, as if it would be able at some point to start its development independently, while at the same time escaping from the political influence of its financial backers. Therefore, Serbia was not in a position to be careless about the real interests of the 'Marshall Plan' for the Balkans. If it happened that the interests are rather neo imperialistic than altruistic, Serbia would never be able to manage a 'win – win' outcome. On the contrary, it would pay the highest possible price for the decision to imitate Germany after WWII. This would mean not just temporarily accepting foreign rule, but also legitimizing the unequal relation between the subordinated and the dominant.⁸⁵ This would again mean that, considering the present condition, Slavoj Zizek was also wrong when he responded to Djindjic that 'the Marshall Plan would turn the Balkans into a temporary protectorate and exploit it economically'. The mistake is located in the word 'temporary', due to a simple reason. Even if the dominant side relinquishes its dominant position, the subordinated side will not be able to do flourish on its own, but will rather have to continue seeking subordination in order to survive. Perhaps the best explanation for the outcome of the implementation of an unofficial 'Marshal plan' in Serbia after 2000. was given by the current Serbian prime minister in an interview for the UK's 'The Telegraph', when he said that 'Serbia has become a pariah nation, untouchable like a leper'.⁸⁶ If this is so, one could think there is no other solution but to recall the ideas of the famous doctor, who specialized him self in curing leprosy.⁸⁷

 

76Süddeutsche Zeitung, Magazin No. 34, 27. 8. 1999

77Ibid.

78Đinđić, Zoran (1988) Jugoslavija kao nedovršena država (Yugoslavia as an Unfinished State), Novi Sad: Književna Zajednica Novog Sada.

79 see: Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, to 1948 http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch24cld2b.htm

80Ibid.

81Djindjic, Zoran, Interview for 'Radio Devic', 27.9.1995 in a small place called Smederevska Palanka : 'Serbian national question should be resolved by the creation of the Union of Serbian States (serb. Savez Srpskih drzava)

82 Immanual Wallerstein developed a theory in order to explain historical changes involved in the rise of the modern world. The modern world system, essentially capitalist in nature, followed the crisis of the feudal system and explains the rise of Western Europe to world supremacy between 1450 and 1670; see: Wallerstein, Immanual, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century ; Academic Press, 1974

84For instance, in 1834, the pro cent of rural inhabitants in Serbia was 93.15 %, and in 1874 - 89.74 % ; see: Miljkovic, Katic, 2002 ; from Lazic, p. 115

85The new ruling class did not form the conditions for the establishment of capitalist policies and structures on the basis of the assumptions found within the existing state order, but these assumptions were imposed upon them from the outside ; see: Lazic, p. 164

86 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/serbia/10093578/Serb-prime-ministers-battle-to-rehabilitate-the-Leper-of-Europe.html

87see: Niess, Frank, Che Guevara, 2003, Hamburg